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10.1  Introduction 
Estimates of manufacturing output are crucial for several issues of concern 
to policymakers. They are frequently used to draw inferences about the health 
of  the U.S.  industrial base and U.S.  international competitiveness. Taken at 
face value, the official data suggest that U.S. manufacturing performance dur- 
ing the 1980s was reasonably good. These data show that: 
1. Despite the emergence of a large trade deficit in the 1980s, manufactur- 
ing output has retained its share in real U.S. GNP. This conclusion suggests 
that fears of deindustrialization  in the United  States have been exaggerated. 
While  U.S. manufacturing  firms may  have lost domestic market share and 
may have had relatively sluggish export growth in the first half of the 1980s, 
apparently  the  domestic  demand  for goods  grew  rapidly  enough  to  enable 
them on the whole to expand production as rapidly as overall GNP. 
2. Output per manhour in U.S. manufacturing grew at a 3.3 percent annual 
rate between  1979 and 1988. This pace is similar to the 3.2 percent growth 
rate recorded between  1960 and  1973 and suggests that U.S. manufacturing, 
unlike the service sector, successfully reversed the productivity  slowdown of 
the 1970s. The performance of manufacturing suggests that U.S. policymak- 
ers concerned  about  aggregate  productivity  growth  should pay  much  more 
attention to the service sector, where productivity growth rates have not recov- 
ered. 
3. The 3.3 percent growth rate of output per manhour in U.S. manufactur- 
ing between 1979 and 1988 places the U.S. in the middle of the pack in man- 
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ufacturing  productivity growth among industrial countries. This is a marked 
improvement  compared to the  1960s and  1970s,  when  U.S.  productivity 
growth in manufacturing was the slowest of the industrial nations. In particu- 
lar, while U.S. output-per-manhour  growth still lags that of Japan,  in recent 
years this gap has narrowed. This evidence suggests that much of the earlier 
differences between the United  States and the rest of  the world reflected  an 
inevitable catch-up phenomenon,  rather than a fundamental flaw in U.S. per- 
formance. 
4. When this productivity performance is combined with modest increases 
in compensation  per manhour  in U.S. manufacturing and the decline in the 
U.S. dollar, it shows there has been  a marked  improvement in relative unit 
labor costs since 1985. Indeed, purchasing power estimates suggest today that 
manufacturing  unit  labor costs are considerably  lower in the  United  States 
than in any other major industrial country. Researchers relying on these data 
argue that with sufficient time, U.S. manufacturing will be highly competitive 
at current exchange rates (Hooper and Larin 1988). 
10.1.1  Criticisms 
The validity of the manufacturing output data, and thus of these inferences 
about the health of the U.S. manufacturing sector, has been called into ques- 
tion. In particular, questions have been raised about the accuracy of the Gross 
Product Originating (GPO) series, which is commonly used to measure output 
in the manufacturing  sector. Lawrence Mishel has argued that the data over- 
state manufacturing growth on several counts. 
1. Alternative Measures. Mishel argues that the GPO measure is inconsist- 
ent with alternative measures of manufacturing output (Mishel  1988, 1989). 
Mishel shows (1988, p. 25) that between 1982 and 1985, real gross output in 
manufacturing increased almost  10 percent less than GPO (24.5 percent ver- 
sus 14.8 percent). He suggests this is suspicious. In the 1980s, U.S. manufac- 
turers  increasingly  sourced  components  abroad.  With  less  value  added  at 
home,  he  believes  gross  output  measures  should  grow  more  rapidly  than 
value-added measures. But the data suggest otherwise. 
Mishel  also finds support for the view  that the value added is overstated 
from input-output (1-0) data. In particular,  he points out that between  1977 
and  1981 manufacturing  output  growth  measured  by  the  GPO series  was 
nearly double the growth implied by the 1-0  data for these years. He suggests 
this outcome resulted from difficulties in assigning output to specific sectors 
during a period in which the sectoral composition of  corporations were in a 
continual state of flux. Mishel argues that manufacturing value-added growth 
will have to be revised downwards if it is to track the benchmark from the 1-0 
series. 
Mishel is also critical of the major downward adjustments-"the  fudge fac- 
tors"-made  by BEA to manufacturing output in 1972  and 1973  to make their 359  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
estimates consistent with the rest of the GNP accounts. The official data indi- 
cate that, measured  in  1982 dollars,  in  1973 the share of manufacturing in 
GNP was 22.6 percent. Removing the downward adjustment would raise this 
share to over 24 percent in 1973. Mishel notes that without these adjustments 
manufacturing GPO would grow much more slowly between 1972 and 1979. 
2. Purchased materials and services. The GNP input deflators for materials 
and  services  (except  for  crude petroleum)  exclude  import  prices  (Mishel 
1988, p. 25). If import prices decline relative to domestic prices but domestic 
prices  are used to deflate all inputs, the result is an understatement  of the 
growth in  inputs  and thus  an  overstatement  of  the growth in value  added. 
Since import  prices declined relative to domestic prices between  1979 and 
1985, according  to BEA, which has accepted this  point,  this could reduce 
manufacturing growth, “perhaps by half a percentage point or more per year” 
A related issue concerns the measurement of services inputs. Many believe 
manufacturing  activities  have  increasingly  been  outsourced  to the  services 
sector. Mishel argues that prices of services used as manufacturing inputs are 
overstated because the deflators BEA uses for some service sector input into 
manufacturing fail to take account of productivity increases. This overstates 
service prices,  understates  service quantities  and thus  biases  upward  value 
added in manufacturing.  The BEA estimates an overstatement of purchased 
services prices by one percent would lead to a 0.3 percent overstatement of 
manufacturing value-added growth in the 1975-85  period. (BEA 1988). 
3. Computer Prices. Edward Denison (1989) has raised questions about the 
hedonic price measures for computers now used in the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA). Denison advocates measuring capital goods output 
by labor inputs. He prefers picking up the impact of technology improvement 
in final goods output rather than in capital inputs, and he argues that the cur- 
rent  practice  leads  to a  significant  overstatement  of  manufacturing  output 
growth.’ Denison  estimates  that the  treatment  of  computers  has  raised  the 
growth rate in manufacturing  output per  manhour by  1.02 percent  annually 
between  1979 and 1986. Instead of the 3.48 percent annual growth in output 
per manhour actually recorded,  without the extraordinary treatment of com- 
puters the rate would be 2.46 percent per year. Manufacturing output per man- 
hour should be marked down accordingly. 
A second issue, highlighted by Baily and Gordon (1988) relates to the in- 
dex number problem which stems from using fixed base-period price weights 
for products like computers  whose relative price has declined rapidly. They 
estimate  that  using  current-year  share weights  for  computers  lowers  the 
growth of output  of producer’s  durable  equipment between  1979 and  1987 
from 2.64 to 2.20 percent. Mishel points out that the use of hedonic indexes 
(BEA 1988, pp. 132-33). 
1. For a rejection of  Denison’s views, see Survey ofCurrenr Business (July 1989). 360  Robert Z. Lawrence 
for inputs such as semiconductors would further lower estimates of computer 
output by  raising input and import measures,  although presumably  hedonic 
measures would also raise estimates of semiconductor output growth. 
10.1.2  Implications 
Taken together, these criticisms raise doubts about the manufacturing out- 
put data. The problems they point to all suggest that U.S. manufacturing out- 
put growth has been overstated.  Mishel estimates that taking account of the 
criticisms that are quantifiable leads to a downward revision in annual manu- 
facturing  value-added  growth to  1.42 percent,  rather than  the official  1.94 
percent, between 1973 and 1979, and to 0.91 percent rather than 2.04 percent 
annually, between 1979 and 1985 (Mishel 1989; p. 40). 
These adjustments clearly could be important. Between 1980 and 1985, for 
example, accepting Mishel’s estimates, the rise in U.S. unit labor costs would 
have been 7 percent more than  estimated by Hooper and Larin (1988). Ac- 
cordingly, the failure of the U.S. trade balance to respond to the incentives of 
allegedly lower U.S. unit labor costs would be less of a puzzle (Hooper 1988). 
Annual labor productivity growth in manufacturing between  1979 and  1985 
would be 2.23 percent-a  slower pace than  in the period  1950 to  1973- 
compared with the official estimate of 3.38 percent. 
It is noteworthy that while Mishel marks down the growth in labor produc- 
tivity  growth  since 1973, his adjustments  for the period  1985 to  1987 are 
minor. He would mark the output growth of manufacturing down by just 0.15 
percent. Indeed, while the computer deflation issues remains, relative import 
prices  were rising over this period,  and thus the manufacturing output esti- 
mates are biased downwards rather than upwards. Between  1985 and  1988, 
output per manhour in U.S. manufacturing increased at an average annual rate 
of 3.7 percent. This suggests the labor productivity growth rates for manufac- 
turing since 1985 have improved greatly over their performance between  1973 
and 1979. Between 1985 and 1988, the recovery in manufacturing labor pro- 
ductivity has been reaL2 
In this paper, I will deal primarily with the objections to the measurement 
of  manufacturing  output  that  involve international  issues,  in particular  the 
questions of outsourcing  of  imports  and the deflation of imported inputs.  I 
will argue that with the exception of the computer price deflation question, 
the case that manufacturing output growth has been seriously overstated has 
not been proved.  I will show that even when chain-weighted prices are used 
to take care of the computer weighting problem, manufacturing output grew 
as rapidly as GNP in the 1980s. At the same time, however, I will argue that 
the manufacturing output estimates should be used with great caution and that 
2. This does not mean, however, that aggregate U.S. productivity growth has fully recovered. 
Between 1985 and 1988, output per hour in the business sector grew 1.8 percent annually (a full 
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the estimates at even more disaggregated  levels leave much to be desired.  I 
will suggest that the data we have available are deficient in coverage and above 
all in their lack of timeliness. Major structural changes could take place in the 
United States, but not become fully apparent in the data for many years. 
10.2  Alternative Measures 
The Census, BEA, and input-output  measures of  nominal  manufacturing 
value added are reported in table 10.1. Between  1972 and 1980 the Census 
measure grew more rapidly than the BEA measure.  But since 1981 the rela- 
tionship  has reversed,  and the GNP value-added  measure  has outpaced  the 
Census measure. Mishel believes the GNP output numbers have become in- 
creasingly inaccurate because they are derived in part from data available only 
on  an enterprise basis. He argues that  the  basis  for assigning  such data to 
particular sectors is outdated since it reflects classifications most recently re- 
vised in 1972 (Mishel 1988, p. 39).’ 
The critical feature of these data is that they all present a very similar pic- 
ture of  nominal value added in manufacturing.  To be sure, the three different 
measures  deviate in some years, and choosing these years as endpoints can 
exaggerate their  differences.  But  over longer periods of  time, their growth 
rates seem quite similar. As shown in table 10.1, between 1972 and 1977 and 
between  1977 and  1987 all  three  measures  have  similar growth rates. The 
differences arise between  1977 and  1980 when  the Census measure  grows 
more rapidly than the GNP measure and in  1981, 1985, and  1986 when the 
BEA measure grows more  rapidly.  But it is hard  to see how differences in 
classification  have  led  to a  systematic  overstatement  in GNP value-added 
gr~wth.~ 
Mishel found that between 1977 and 1981, the input-output data showed 
slower growth in manufacturing than the GNP. This is borne out by the calcu- 
lations reported in  table  10.1. However,  as also reported  in table  10.1, by 
1983 the two series had converged. Accordingly, after 1977, the GNP series 
for value added matches the Census series in its growth through 1986 and the 
input-output series for growth through 1983. The shipments series in the Cen- 
sus and 1-0 data are virtually identical in 1977, 1981, and 1983. 
In sum, this examination does not bear out the charge that the Census and 
1-0  data suggest BEA has made serious classification errors. 
Mishel is also concerned by the reported  growth in the ratio of real value 
3. The BEA  and Census measures are conceptually different, since the Census data include 
purchased services. But Mishel argues the growth in purchased services is not a major reason 
behind the measured differences in the series growth after 1979. He points out that current-dollar 
service sector inputs accounted for only 9 percent of gross output in 1972 and have increased only 
slightly since then. 
4. The Census cautions that the data after 1982 are not strictly comparable with the data prior 
to  1982 because prior to  1982, respondents were allowed to report their inventories using any 
generally accepted accounting method. See, for example, Annual Survey ofManufacrures (1985). Table 10.1  Alternative Measures of Nominal Manufacturing Output 
Value Added  Value Added (1977 = 100)  Ratios (1977 = 100)  Shipments 
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added to shipments in the 1980s. He believes this growth is inconsistent with 
the widespread view of increased outsourcing. If producers now import prod- 
ucts once made at home, Mishel argues this should be expected to raise the 
ratio of  shipments to value added. However, in principle this is not correct. 
Shipments reflect both the value of imported inputs and the double counting 
of inputs shipped between domestic firms in partially finished form. Foreign 
outsourcing will raise the value of the former, but it will also reduce the value 
of the latter. If for example, General Motors makes auto parts in one plant and 
ships them to another for painting and to a third for final assembly, these parts 
will show up three times in the shipments data. If GM simply imports painted 
parts, the parts will show up only when embodied in the final product. Mishel 
implies that increased outsourcing should raise the ratio of shipments to value 
added. In fact, however, increased outsourcing has an ambiguous impact on 
the ratio of shipments to value added. 
Mishel compares the real  gross output growth rates with  those of  value 
added at a disaggregated level. He finds that between  1979 and  1986, the 
decline in the ratio of gross output to value added is widespread. It occurred 
in 15 industries accounting for 81.8 percent of gross output. But he also shows 
that the same phenomenon occurred in  15 industries accounting for 57.3 per- 
cent of output between 1973 and 1979. The data might be capturing a growing 
and widespread tendency to economize on inputs, rather than errors in input 
measures. 
10.3  Deflation 
When estimating real value added in manufacturing, BEA uses domestic 
producer prices (where available) to deflate manufacturing inputs. In fact of 
course,  many  inputs are actually imported.  According  to Mishel,  the use 
of  inappropriate deflators is another major reason for the overstatement of 
growth in the real GPO series. 
But it is important to be careful about the years over which inadequate de- 
flation presents a problem. According to BEA, the use of the inappropriate 
import deflators resulted in an overstatement of value-added growth in manu- 
facturing of 0.5 percent per year between 1979 and 1985 (BEA 1988). During 
periods of dollar depreciation in the 1970s and after 1985, however, the bias 
was in the opposite direction. Indeed, between  1985 and 1988 almost all of 
the relative decline in import prices of  the early 1980s was reversed. More- 
over, according to BEA, “taking account of  import prices would have little 
effect on manufacturing growth from  1972 to  1985, because prices of  im- 
ported materials grew at about the same rate as prices of  domestically pro- 
duced materials” (BEA 1988, p. 132). 
Mishel’s study divides the period  1979 to  1985 in  two. He finds that be- 
tween 1979 and 1982 the series grew by similar amounts; constant dollar out- 
put measured by gross output declined by  1  1.1 percent, whereas the constant 364  Robert Z. Lawrence 
dollar GPO series declined 9.0 percent.  It is in the recovery phase, between 
1982 and 1985, that the two series differed; the gross output series rose only 
14.8 percent,  while the GPO series increases 24.5 percent.  Thus, what  he 
terms the value added intensity puzzle is essentially a feature of the subperiod 
1982 to 1985, rather than of the period  1979 to 1985 as a whole. Indeed, this 
is precisely the timing one would expect if increased foreign sourcing is be- 
hind the puzzle, since it was during this period that imports grew especially 
strongly. 
It seems reasonable to assume that imports of homogeneous primary com- 
modities will have prices similar to domestically produced commodities.  But 
this need not be the case with imported inputs of semifinished manufacturing 
components. Accordingly,  the bias will stem mainly from the failure to use 
the correct deflators for imports that are classified as manufactured goods. 
It should also be noted that domestic producer prices will miss thejrst use 
of an imported input in the production process, but will capture accurately the 
prices of products which embody imports.  For example, if imported steel is 
used to make automobile axles, the prices of inputs into axles will be mismea- 
sured, but when the axles are used to produce automobiles, their prices will 
be measured accurately. 
To  estimate how large a bias is introduced into the real value-added  mea- 
sures, a price series for imported inputs is required. The published price series 
that are readily available are reported in table 10.2. One series that by its name 
appears ideal for this purpose is the end-use, fixed-weight import price series 
for industrial  supplies and materials.  But  it is unclear what domestic price 
series should be used. Between  1980 and 1987, the end-use import price se- 
ries  for imports of nonfuel industrial supplies rose 4 percent  more than the 
producer price series for nonfuel crude materials, but it rose about 13 percent 
less than  the producer  price  index for manufacturing materials and compo- 
nents. 
Nonetheless, the comparison with the PPI for manufacturing materials sug- 
gests that most of  the decline  in relative  import prices took  place between 
1980 and  1982 (and not  during  the  subperiod  1982 to 1985, in which the 
value-added  intensity puzzle appears.  Between  1982 and  1987, the end-use 
import price series for nonfuel industrial supplies increased at the same rate 
as the PPI for manufacturing materials and  component^.^ 
Unfortunately, the concept of industrial supplies is not entirely appropriate 
for use in this context. The industrial supplies end-use category neglects the 
manufacturing  inputs that are included in the end-use categories for capital 
5.  The end-use categories forfinished goods present a similar picture. In 1987 the relative prices 
of imported consumer goods were back to their 1980 levels; relative imported automobile prices 
were about 10 percent above their 1980 levels, but relative imported capital goods prices remained 
26 percent below their 1980 levels. The major declines in relative import prices appear to have 
taken place in  1981 and  1982. Even capital goods had returned to their  1982 relative levels by 
1987. Of course, these categories may cover up rather large compositional differences. 365  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
Table 10.2  Producer and Import Price Series 
Import 
Producer Prices  Prices  Ratios 
Manufacturing  Nonfiiel,  Nonfuel 
Materials &  Nonfood  Industrial 
Components  Crude Materials  Supplies  PPI Components  PPI Crude 

















































Nore; Import price series for fixed-weights end-use 
goods and automotive products. There are, therefore, no readily available im- 
port  price aggregates that  are suitable for the  purpose at hand.  Indeed,  it 
would be extremely useful to a user of the import data if an import price series 
for manufacturing components was available. 
Since there is no such series available, I have tried to construct one. How- 
ever, even at the disaggregated 2-digit SIC code level, a complete set of import 
price data by industry is not available for the period under consideration. BLS 
has now  completed the task of  producing such data, but its coverage in the 
early 1980s was spotty. 
Nonetheless I  have tried to get a quantitative estimate of  the problem by 
using the price series that are available. I have used  the  1983 input-output 
table to obtain a system of weights for this purpose. 1-0 table 1 indicates the 
use of commodities by  industries. By assuming that imports were used in the 
same proportions as domestic output, I can estimate the share of manufactured 
imports used as inputs in manufacturing. 
Table  10.3 reports the ratios of  domestic PPIs to import prices at several 
points in the  1980s. For June 1981, price data were available on industries 
accounting  for  44  percent  of  1983  manufacturing  imported  inputs.  The 
weighted average of available PPIhmport price ratios in 1981 was 16 percent 
below the 1985 levels. (That is, the weighted ratio had a value of  0.84 where 
1985 = 1.0; in other words, relative import prices were  19 percent above 
their  1985 levels.) After rising to a peak in 1985, by  the end of  1987 these 
relative prices had returned to their levels of June 198  1. Over the period 198  1 
to 1987, therefore, the impact of these imported prices appears to have washed 
out. By  1987, relative PPIs in sectors accounting for 67 percent of all manu- 
facturing inputs were 9 percent lower than in December 1982. PPIs in sectors Table 10.3  Ratios of Industry Producer Price to Import Price Index (1985 =  1) 
SIC Code 
(1)  (2) 
RPPI  RPPI 
June  1981  Dec 1982 
(3)  (4) 
RPPI  RPPI 
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Source: Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
Note: Weights of imported manufactured goods inputs derived using 1983 input-output table. RPPI =  Ratio of domestic producer price index to  import prices. 367  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
accounting for 86 percent of all levels were 8 percent lower than in December 
1983. 
Real value added is estimated by  the double-deflation method. The series 
on outputs and inputs are deflated separately, and real value added is estimated 
from their difference. Using the 1983 1-0  table, I estimate that imported man- 
ufactured inputs accounted for $79 billion of  the total $1347 billion inputs 
into manufacturing. Manufacturing value added was $708 billion.  Using an 
imports-input price index which was  10 percent too high would lead to an 
upward bias in estimated value added equal to (.  10 x 79)/708, or 1.1 percent. 
Between 1982 and 1985 relative import prices declined by  19 percent. Using 
the parameters discussed above suggests the bias to growth over this period 
would have been about 2.1 percent. 
But in fact, the ratio of manufactured imports to shipments increased con- 
siderably between 1983 and 1986. Thus the 1983 value may underestimate the 
bias introduced to later years. I have used the shipments and import data for 
1986 to estimate the value of  imported manufacturing inputs that would be 
used in the 1983 output mix given the 1986 import-to-shipments ratios. This 
analysis indicates that given the rise in the ratio of imports to shipments be- 
tween  1983 and 1986, the 1983 mix of  products would have been produced 
using $108 billion of manufactured imports rather than $78 billion. This sug- 
gests that by  1986 a 10 percent import price bias would have resulted in a 1.5 
percent overstatement of output. Given the 19 percent relative price increase, 
a bias of 2.9 percent in growth would have resulted. 
These numbers are meant to be illustrative rather than accurate. They are 
based only on partial information about the price series. But they do suggest 
that the use of inappropriate deflators is unlikely to be the full explanation for 
the difference of almost 10 percent between the growth of the GPO and gross 
output series between  1982 and  1985. The data could be capturing reality 
rather than measurement error. 
It should also be  noted that  most of  the bias would  have taken place  in 
growth estimates between 1982 and 1983. By December 1982, relative import 
prices were only 3 percent above their 1985 levels. Thus, the downward bias 
in growth after 1982 would have been relatively minor. Moreover, by  1987 
relative import prices had returned to their 1982 levels. Accordingly, inappro- 
priate deflators are a minor factor in estimates for GPO growth between 1982 
and 1987 measured in 1982 dollars. 
In  sum,  this  analysis  does  not  suggest that  major  differences  in  price 
changes between domestic and imported products exerted an important down- 
ward bias on the manufacturing output measures between 1982 and 1987, and 
indeed, according to BEA itself, no bias was present over the period 1972 to 
1985. The bias, may however, have been present in the early 1980s. The anal- 
ysis also suggests that at most about 3 of the 10 percentage-point difference in 
growth between the GPO and  gross-output series between  1982 and  1985 
could be due to inappropriate import deflators. 368  Robert Z. Lawrence 
BEA estimates that ignoring import prices biased the growth estimates of 
manufacturing output upward by 0.5 percent per year between 1979 and 1985. 
Assuming all of this took place between 1982 and 1985, it would amount to 3 
percent-an  estimate quite close to the one I have obtained. Even if we add in 
the additional 0.3 percent per year Mishel believes is attributable to the over- 
statement of  services input prices (1989, p. 40), we could explain only about 
4 percentage points of the value-added intensity puzzle. 
10.3.1  Computers 
Denison’s objections to the procedures used to deflate computers raise fun- 
damental issues.6 His suggestions are appropriate for a measure which seeks 
to ensure that technological innovations appear in the residual rather than as 
inputs.  However,  from the standpoint of appraising sectoral productivity,  it 
seems more  appropriate  to ensure that  improvements  in  computers  are as- 
cribed to the sector producing them. The points made by Baily and Gordon 
(1988) about the weighting  scheme used for measuring output is, however, 
relevant. The use of the  1982 implicit deflators leads to an overstatement of 
real manufacturing output growth after 1982. 
Table 10.4 reports an estimate of manufacturing real output growth using a 
chain-weighting method for calculating growth. In each year, manufacturing 
output growth is calculated as the weighted average of growth in SIC 35, the 
2-digit category which includes computers, and the growth in the rest of man- 
ufacturing, where the weights are the shares of each series in nominal manu- 
facturing output in the previous year. This method indicates that between 1979 
and  1987 manufacturing  output increased by  18  percent,  in contrast to the 
20.4 percent rise in the NIPA accounts. Over the period  1979 to 1987, there- 
fore, this effect reduced manufacturing growth by 0.26 percent per year. Al- 
most all of the reduction took place between  1984 and 1987, the growth for 
which is overstated by an average of 0.53 percent per year. 
The weighting scheme also affects estimates of overall GNP growth. Table 
10.5 reports the growth in real GNP estimated by deflating the annual growth 
in nominal GNP by the chain-weighted deflator for GNP published by BEA. 
Between 1979 and 1987 this reduces the estimated GNP growth from 20.7 to 
19.7 percent.  Between  1979 and  1987 the share of the chain-weighted esti- 
mate of  manufacturing growth in (chain-weighted) GNP declines by  1.1 per- 
cent. Specifically, taking account of the impact of the weighting of computers 
implies that instead of  similar 21.8 percent shares of  manufacturing in real 
GNP in  1979 and  1987, the share of manufacturing in GNP would (barely) 
decline from 21.8 to 21.5  percent. 
6. For a more extensive discussion of the impact of computer deflation methods on trade flows, 
see the paper by Ellen Meade, chapter 2 in this volume. 369  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
Table 10.4  Percentage Growth Rates for Manufacturing 
Year 
Chain-Weighted 
Index  In  1982 $  Difference 
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-2.38 
Table 10.5  GNPIManufacturing  Ratios 
Chain-Weighted  National Income Accounts 
Technique  Basis (1982 $) 
Difference 
GNP  Manufacturing  Ratio A  GNP  Manufacturing  Ratio B  Ratio 





















































1.  I29 




















0.01  1 
0.01  1 
Nore: Figures may not sum to zero due to rounding 
10.4  Other Measures 
Mishel has examined alternative measure of  manufacturing output to infer 
the  accuracy  of the manufacturing  output measures.  In fact, as reported  in 
table 10.6,  the most commonly used measures tell a consistent story. In partic- 
ular, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Industrial Production Index for manu- 
facturing, derived using different methods from the GNP output measure, pro- 
vides  a picture of  manufacturing  output which is remarkably  similar to the 
GNP measure. Between 1979 and 1987 the FRB suggests output growth of 21 
percent,  an estimate virtually identical to the GNP measure.  Similarly, those 370  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 10.6  U.S. Manufacturing, 1979 to 1987 
Value-added  Value  Industrial  Industrial  Gross Capital  Net Capital 
































































Sources: U.S.  National Income Accounts; Federal Reserve Board; Survey of  Currenr Business 
*Measured in  1982 dollars. 
concerned about  the manufacturing base can draw some comfort from the 
measures of the gross capital stock and industrial capacity, both of which have 
their own problems, but both of which indicate a rise in industrial capacity of 
over 20 percent. The net capital stock, which reflects the rapid depreciation of 
short-lived assets, is a less optimistic measure and the only indicator suggest- 
ing a sluggish expansion of  the industrial base. 
Finally, as reported in table 10.7, the national income accounts’ measure of 
goods production, obtained from expenditure data, also shows a growth in the 
1980s that  has kept pace with  GNP.  This measure shows that goods value 
added accounted for 43.2 percent of GDP in  1979 and 44.3 percent in 1988. 
10.4.1  Expenditure Measures 
Measures of  final demand expenditures have the virtue that they are not 
subject to sectoral allocation problems. When BEA estimates real consump- 
tion it measures purchases of products directly and can avoid the problems of 
allocating output by industry. In addition, the goods measure does not apply 
an inappropriate deflator to imported goods. The measure of goods in GNP is 
obtained by  subtracting the deflated value of imported merchandise from real 
expenditures on  consumption,  investment, government  spending,  and  ex- 
ports. Accordingly, the goods measures offer a useful check on the consist- 
ency of  the output data.  Indeed,  Edward Denison has argued that industry 
productivity measures should be supplemented by  estimates that allocate in- 
puts by sectors of final demand. 
But the expenditure data do suffer from certain disadvantages if they are to 
be  used  to deduce U.S.  manufacturing production. On the one hand, final 
expenditures on products classified as goods include not only value added in 
sectors such as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, but also distribution 
margins and other service inputs embodied in goods. On the other hand, final 
expenditures on nongoods categories (e.g., construction and services) reflect 371  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
Table 10.7  Goods Share in GDP 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




































48  28.4 
49.2  27. I 
52  27.7 
51  29.2 
51.4  29.3 
50.4  29.5 
51  29.8 
53.8  28.8 
53.6  28.3 
54.5  28.9 
55  29 
Nore: Sales =  value added  in  goods plus merchandise  imports in  1982 dollars; Margin =  GVA 
minus value added in manufacturing,  mining, and agriculture. 
Table 10.8  Sources of Goods Demand (derived from 1983 1-0 table; in Billions 
of Dollars) 
Goods-Producing 
Industries  Manufacturing 
Value added  906.7  707.8 
Due to nongoods end use  218  157.1 
Due to goods end use  688.7  550.7 
(4)kotal goods final demand  0.54  0.43 
Due to major nongoods end use  141.4  112.3 
Share of  major nongoods end use  0.65  0.71 
(2)/total nongoods end use  0.13  0.09 
Nore: 1-0 sectors 11,  12, 65-68,  70-79  (i.e., construction  and services besides trade).  Major 
nongoods=construction  (1-0 11 and 12), eating and drinking places (1-0 74) and health, edu- 
cational, and social services and nonprofit organizations (1-0 77). 
value added to services by the manufacturing and other goods-producing sec- 
tors.  Final  spending for construction, for example, reflects payments for 
building equipment and materials in addition to construction services. Simi- 
larly, final spending on health care reflects payments for the gold dentists use 
in fillings. 
Nonetheless, the goods expenditure data corroborate the BEA value-added 
estimates, particularly for the  1981-86  period about which questions have 
been raised. As shown in table 10.8, goods output has matched GDP growth 
throughout the 1980s. Goods were actually a higher share of real GDP in 1982 
dollars in  1988 (44.3 percent) than they were in  1980 (42.9 percent),  1979 372  Robert Z. Lawrence 
(43.2 percent),  or 1970 (42.9); the  1987 share was only slightly lower than 
the share in 1969 (43.9 percent). 
In the light of the large trade deficit which emerged in this period, the rapid 
growth in goods output is a surprise. But it reflects the strength of the growth 
in final sales of goods. As reported in table 10.8, real goods sales, defined as 
goods value added plus merchandise imports, grew considerably more rapidly 
than real GDP. By 1987 the ratio of goods sales to GDP of  .55 was almost 10 
percent higher than in 1982. In 1987, real merchandise imports were equal to 
1  1.5  percent of GDP in I982 dollars, up from 7.4 percent in 1982. 
Assume for the moment that none of the products of the goods-producing 
sectors (i.e.,  manufacturing,  agriculture,  and  mining) are embodied  in ex- 
penditures on services and construction. If value added in manufacturing pro- 
duction  was  overstated  in the  GNP accounts,  but goods expenditures  (and 
value added in mining and agriculture) were accurately measured, subtracting 
the GNP estimates of value added in the goods-producing sectors would yield 
too low a margin for distribution and other services embodied in final sales of 
goods. As reported in table 10.7, however, between 1982 and 1987 the margin 
computed in this fashion  increased by 0.9 percent  of GDP.  One should of 
course expect some increase in the margin because it will include the distri- 
bution margins on imports. But even taking account of these goods by com- 
paring the margin with sales rather than with output does not suggest that in 
1987 the margin was suspiciously low. Thus the goods end-use data do not 
suggest a decline in the real share of  manufacturing in value added over the 
1980s. 
But this  analysis ignores the role of value added in the goods sector and 
embodied in final sales of nongoods (i.e., services and structures).  If value 
added in the production of these goods grew at a different pace from value 
added  in  goods  production  elsewhere,  this  analysis  could  be  seriously 
flawed.’ To get a better handle on this issue I have used the 1983 input-output 
table to determine if this is in fact a problem.  1-0 table 5 for 1983 allows an 
estimate of  goods production embodied in nongoods (i.e., services and con- 
struction) final domestic demand. 
This computation  requires taking account of  imported inputs. 1-0 table 5 
indicates the direct and indirect requirements by industry for each dollar of 
final demand. It  does not, however,  explicitly  indicate the  import  content 
of these requirements.  One plausible assumption is that purchases of imports 
of a product by an industry are proportional to the overall share of imports in 
total shipments of that product. 
Using this assumption to adjust overall inputs for domestic inputs,  I esti- 
mate that in 1983  the value of goods embodied in the final demand for services 
and construction was $218 billion (see table 10.8). This represented 12.6 per- 
cent of the overall value of nongoods final demand and 24 percent of the over- 
7. I am indebted to Lawrence Mishel for pointing this out to me. 373  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
all value added in goods-producing industries. Subtracting $21  8 billion from 
total value added in goods-producing industries ($906.7 billion) implies that 
$688.7 billion, or 76 percent of the value added in goods-producing sectors, 
is embodied in the final demand for goods. In 1983, this represented 54 per- 
cent of final goods demand. A similar analysis indicates 22.2 percent of man- 
ufacturing value added is embodied in nongoods final demand and that man- 
ufactured goods account for just 43 percent of the value of final goods sales. 
To  use  goods-output  final  sales  data  to  infer  performance  in  goods- 
producing sectors, it is necessary to assume that the relative influence of  the 
services and construction sectors remained constant (the demand for goods 
due to nongoods final demand grew at a rate similar to the demand for goods 
due to goods final demand). This appears to have been the case. According to 
the input-output table, in 1983 three sectors (construction, food and drinking 
establishments, and health, education and nonprofits) accounted for about 65 
percent of  the overall demand for goods due to nongoods final demand (and 
71 percent of the manufactured goods embodied in nongoods final demand). 
Between 1982 and 1986, real demand for construction, purchased meals and 
beverages, and health,  education,  and nonprofit services increased in  all  5 
percent faster than real GDP. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that 
the demand for goods embodied in  sales by  these sectors increased propor- 
tionately. Taking account of the role of goods embodied in services, therefore, 
strengthens the inference that goods production value added grew at least as 
rapidly as real GNP over this period. 
For a precise estimate of the role of goods-value added in components of 
final demand, it is necessary to have 1-0 data that are up to date. Nonetheless, 
these back-of-the-envelope calculations using the 1983 1-0 matrix and a few 
major final demand components suggest that BEA estimates of growth in real 
manufacturing value added are roughly consistent with the story provided by 
the expenditure data. And the story told by these data is that the ability of the 
United States to produce goods has grown as rapidly as its ability to produce 
services. 
The data for final goods sales do not distinguish between value added to 
goods in manufacturing and value added in nongoods sectors. Thus the ex- 
penditure data are consistent with a shift of  production activities from the 
manufacturing sector to the services sector. 
10.5  Disaggregation 
A related issue concerns the degree to which the data can be taken as rep- 
resentative of manufacturing performance in general. Most international com- 
parisons are done for manufacturing sectors as a whole. These variables are 
often used to explain export and import prices and to predict trade and invest- 
ment flows for manufacturing as a whole. 
But if U.S. output growth has been confined, for example, to just one sector 374  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 10.9  Manufacturing  Output Growth By Industry, 1979-86 
Industry 
GNP  Of which 
IP  Value Added  IP -  GNP 
(1)  (2)  (1)-(2)  1983/1979  198811983 
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Sources: Data Resources Index, Bureau of  Labor Statistics; Department of Commerce 
Note: IP =  industrial production index. 
of manufacturing (e.g., computers), does it make sense to use data on relative 
unit labor costs to draw conclusions for trade flows in general? Indeed, taking 
the  U.S.  GNP data  at  face  value  suggests that  besides  the  nonelectrical- 
machinery sector (the sector that includes computers), U.S.  manufacturing 
performance has been weak (see table 10.9, col. 2). Similarly, the dispersion 
in Japanese performance may be even higher than in the United States (see 
table 10.10). In particular, the electronics sector has dominated Japanese per- 
formance. Does it make sense then to draw inferences for Japanese trade flows 
and other aspects of manufacturing performance when the data actually reflect 
behavior in just a few sectors? 
The comfort taken  from the  apparent consistency of  the aggregate data 
quickly disappears when the components are examined in greater detail. Take, 
for example, the U.S. data on output growth by  2-digit SIC codes, as mea- 
sured by the GNP accounts and by the industrial production index reported in 
table 10.9. While both measures suggest that manufacturing growth has been 
around 20 percent between 1979 and  1986, they locate this growth in very 
different  sectors.  These divergences have existed for a long time (Popkin 375  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
Table 10.10  Japanese Manufacturing Output, 1986 (1980 =  100) 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Value Added  IP  Difference 
Manufacturing Total 
GNP Measure Greater: 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Electric and electronic 
Fabricated metals 
Machinery, except electric 
Transportation 






IP Measure Greater: 
Petroleum and coal 
Food and kindred 










































Sources: National Income Accounts; Japan Statistical Yearbook  1987 
Note; IP =  industrial production index. 
1979, Gottsegen and Ziemer 1968). The GNP view suggests that the manu- 
facturing performance  is essentially a computer  story; it reports nonelectric 
machinery growth at 75.5 percent over this six-year period.* 
This suggests one should be very cautious in forecasting aggregate manu- 
facturing trade and investment flows on the basis of these numbers. At a min- 
imum these data should be adjusted to reflect their importance in trade flows 
rather than domestic production. 
But the industrial-production (IP) data suggests manufacturing growth has 
been  relatively  diffused.  Nonelectrical machinery  IP grew by  18.4 percent, 
not much faster than the manufacturing aggregate. With the major exception 
of  nonelectrical  machinery,  IP growth  was  considerably  faster  than  GNP 
growth in most sectors. Remarkable differences for growth in the  1980s in- 
clude the estimates for printing and publishing,  with IP up 42.8 percent  and 
GNP up just 12.5 percent, and those for tobacco and lumber. 
10.5.1  The Role of Outsourcing 
Is  there  a  relationship  between  sectors  which  have  high  or  increasing 
amounts  of  outsourcing  and  sectoral differences in growth as estimated  by 
these different measures? If both measures are accurate, we might not be sur- 
8. In the GNP data, manufacturing minus nonelectrical machinery grew by just  10.8 percent 
between 1980 and 1986. Nonelectrical machinery accounted for almost half of all manufacturing 
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prised if, particularly in the short run, IP shows more rapid growth than GNP 
in sectors where the industry increases its degree of outsourcing.  IP which 
measures physical  output units will fail to take account of  the lower value- 
added ratios. On the other hand, if the sector has a high level of outsourcing, 
IP will grow more slowly than GNP, if relative import price declines in inputs 
are ignored. 
My  proxy  for levels of  import  dependence  was  derived  using  the  1983 
input-output table, together with shipments and import data for 1986. As dis- 
cussed  above, purchases  of  imported  inputs used  by  each 2-digit  industry 
were estimated by assuming that the share of imported inputs of each com- 
modity by each industry equals the share of imports in total output of each 
commodity. The variable  LEV is equal to the ratio of estimated manufactured 
imported inputs to 1983 value added. 
My measure of changes in sourcing is the growth in imports used by each 
industry if 1983 output had been produced using the share of imports in output 
of each commodity in 1986. The variable CHANGE is the ratio of the growth in 
estimated imported inputs to 1983 value added. 
Table 10.11 reports the correlation between LEV and CHANGE, and the dif- 
ferences between growth in industrial production and in GNP by 2-digit  in- 
dustry over the years 1979-1986 and two subperiods (DIFF). If outsourcing is 
important, DIFF should be positively  correlated with CHANGE. If  deflation is 
important,  DIFF should be negatively correlated with LEV and CHANGE. 
The correlations  are negative,  but none are significant.  Neither levels nor 
changes in the degree of  outsourcing appear to provide an explanation for the 
differences between IP and GNP measures of growth. When these variables 
are regressed against DIFF neither is significant (t-ratios are around 0.2) and 
the R2  is extremely low. 
In sum it is not possible to find a simple explanation for the differences 
between  the GNP and IP measures  on the basis  of  the effects of  levels or 
changes in foreign outsourcing.  This result resembles that of Griliches and 
Table 10.11  Relationship of Differences in Growth of Industrial Production and 
Manufacturing GNP  to Measures of Outsourcing 
1983/1979  1986/1983  1986/1979  LEV  CHANGE 
1983/ 1979  1 
1986/1983  0.275  1 
19861 1979  0.679  0.892  1 
LEV  -0.221  -  0.342  -0.385  1 
CHANGE  -  0.283  -0.309  -0.369  0.953  1 
Sources: Data Resources Index; Department of Commerce. 
Note: Values of R greater than  .45 are significant at the 95% level. LEV  = ratio of estimated use 
of  manufacturing inputs to value added; CHANGE = ratio of  estimated change in use of import 
manufacturing inputs to value added. Estimates of inputs derived using 1983 1-0 table. 377  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
Siege1 (1989). They concluded at a more disaggregated level that an industry’s 
propensity to outsource was not related to its acceleration in productivity. 
10.5.2  Comparison with Japan 
Increasingly,  industries in the United  States are comparing their perform- 
ance to that of Japanese industries (Gordon and Baily  1989). It is of  interest 
therefore  to consider if  Japanese  data present  a more consistent picture  of 
performance  disaggregated  by industry  than  the  U.S. data do. Table  10.10 
reports growth by 2-digit sector in Japan as reported in the GNP accounts and 
the Japanese industrial production data. The differences are striking. For the 
United  States, at least for the aggregate the manufacturing GNP and IP in- 
dexes  agree;  in  the Japanese  data the growth  story is orders of  magnitude 
different. The overall rise in the GNP of 43.4 percent between  1980 and 1986 
was  over twice  the  21.8 percent  rise  recorded  in  the  industrial  production 
index. 
The similarity between the Japanese and United States data is in the degree 
to which growth has been concentrated in just a few sectors. Just as changes 
in U.S. manufacturing output growth have been influenced heavily by changes 
in the nonelectrical  machinery  sector,  so changes  in  Japanese growth have 
been dominated by changes in electrical machinery. This suggests that the use 
of this aggregate data, weighted with domestic weights, may not be particu- 
larly useful when drawing implications about trade performance or interna- 
tional investment flows. Thus, for example, measures of manufacturing unit 
labor costs provide a very poor explanation for Japanese export prices. How- 
ever, measures reweighting industry unit labor costs by export shares do much 
better (Lawrence 1979, pp.  101-212). 
Those using the aggregate manufacturing to draw implications about trade, 
do so at their peril. 
10.6  Conclusion 
This analysis provides some comfort for those who use the aggregate data 
on  manufacturing output. I have come to several conclusions. (1) The census 
and recent input-output data do not suggest that major systematic misclassifi- 
cations led to an upward bias in the GPO output measures. (2) The inappro- 
priate use of  domestic deflators for imported inputs imparted an upward bias 
to growth of between 2 and 3 percent between  1982 and 1985, but by  1987 
the  bias  had  been  almost completely  reversed.  (3) The goods output data, 
together  with  the expansion  in  expenditures  by  major goods-using  sectors, 
suggest the GPO estimates for goods production are consistent with the more 
accurate expenditure data. (4) Some of the puzzling rise in value-added inten- 
sity in the early 1980s is due to the use of inappropriate deflators, but much of 
it could be a reflection  of reality. On  a priori grounds increased outsourcing 
could raise or lower the ratio of  value added to shipments.  (5)  Finally, the 378  Robert Z. Lawrence 
GNP, gross capital stock, and industrial production measures all tell the same 
story. 
On the other hand, not all of the objections to the data can be laid to rest. 
In particular, the issues relating to the weighting of computer prices remain 
troublesome. Indeed there are reasons to believe that post-1982 growth has 
been overstated as a result of  the weights used for computer prices (Young 
1989a, 1989b). These weights bias upwards the post-1982 growth in  both 
goods expenditure and manufacturing output. Using chain-weighted indexes 
suggests that between 1979 and 1987 the annual growth rates in manufactur- 
ing output should be lower by 0.26 percent. 
The dramatic differences in the 2-digit industry output growth between the 
industrial production and NIPA measures do not inspire much confidence. I 
was unable here to find a simple explanation for the differences between these 
series on the basis of  levels and changes in  foreign outsourcing, so these 
troublesome differences remain. Such differences appear even larger in  the 
data for Japan. 
Edward Denison ( 1989) has questioned the validity of productivity analysis 
by  industry. He argues that the allocation of output by  industry is so difficult 
and unstable that industry productivity measures are unreliable. He advocates 
estimating productivity growth by allocating inputs to sectors of final demand. 
Nonetheless, policymakers are inevitably led to rely on these measures in 
making judgments about economic performance. The analysis here certainly 
lends support to Denison’s view  that disaggregated measures, particularly 
those below the one-digit SIC level, need to be taken with a large grain of salt. 
The  sectoral dispersion of  growth appears relatively high. Those using 
these data to explain international flows should give serious thought to the 
degree to which the aggregate manufacturing data represent developments that 
are highly concentrated in a few sectors. 
10.6.1  Mishel 
While he raises numerous questions about the manufacturing data, Mishel 
(1989) concentrates on four effects which he quantifies to support his case that 
real manufacturing output growth has been severely overstated. What remains 
of these effects in the light of the analysis above? 
1. The overstatement in growth due to the neglect of import prices is impor- 
tant in the early 1980s but, according to BEA, leaves growth between 1972 
and  1985 unaffected. Since the dollar depreciated in  1971, growth between 
1970 and 1985 is likely to be understated rather than overstated. 
2. The fudge-factor adjustments are difficult to appraise. It does appear, 
however, that the BEA data conform with the industrial production and goods 
expenditure data. It should also be noted that these adjustments became nec- 
essary when the data were rebased to 1982. Measured in 1972 dollars, manu- 
facturing growth in the 1970s was as rapid as GNP growth. 
3. Mishel points out that the services purchased by the manufacturing sec- 379  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
tor  have been overdeflated. He  uses what he  terms a “relatively arbitrary” 
estimate that this effect was one percent per year. Indeed, his estimate is to- 
tally arbitrary. In any case, this problem leads to an overstatement of growth 
in manufacturing but an understatement of  the growth of services embodied 
in manufactured goods. It would have no impact on conclusions about what 
has happened to the ability of the United States to produce goods. 
4. There remains the impact due to the weighting of computers. As dem- 
onstrated above, this effect is significant after 1984, but the argument remains 
valid that over the long run and over the 1980s, manufacturing has not de- 
clined as a share of GNP. 
10.6.2  Data 
There are two critical data problems faced by  those trying to study these 
issues. The first is one of a lack of timeliness. The input-output tables present 
a unique set of matched nominal data for inputs, outputs, and trade, but there 
is an extremely long delay before these data are made available. This is a 
major hindrance, not only for analysts but also for those government agencies 
that estimate other data.  In estimating purchased inputs to determine value 
added, for example, BEA assumes, in the absence of current dollar detail, 
that  manufacturers continue  to  purchase  inputs-both  materials  and  ser- 
vices-in  the same proportions as they did in the most recent comprehensive 
input-output table. This study utilized the most recent comprehensive input- 
output table available, based on the quinquennial census conducted in  1977. 
This table was published in  1984. The next benchmark table, based on the 
1982 census, became available only in late 1989. The pattern of past delays 
suggests that this 1982 table will be used as a benchmark through 1994. 
When the most  recently available data for the United  States were from 
1977, some input-output data for Japan for 1987 were already readily avail- 
able, and complete 1-0 tables for Japan were available for 1985. Indeed, the 
lag in producing the U.S. 1-0 table has become an obstacle to Japan’s statisti- 
cal work. The Japanese government is trying to construct an 1-0 table for a 
major portion of the world economy. It has been forced to purchase the (non- 
benchmark) estimate of the 1-0  table for the United States for 1985 compiled 
by the University of Maryland, instead of waiting for the release of the official 
U. S. table for that year. 
A second major problem is the absence of  price series available at a level 
compatible with the 1-0 data. In the case of  imports, this problem has been 
partially remedied recently with the new BLS price series. It would be useful 
if price aggregates were available that are more appropriate indicators of for- 
eign sourcing than the end-use categories. 
Finally, as international factors become increasingly important in the U.S. 
economy it is important that the data reflecting this activity be improved and 
that domestic measures take better account of international developments. Ac- 
cordingly, even though over the period  1982 through  1987 as a whole, real 380  Robert Z. Lawrence 
manufacturing value-added growth measures have not been heavily affected 
by the inadequate input price measures currently used, the inadequacies in the 
data have led to  serious distortions in other subperiods. BEA should deflate 
inputs by price series which include imported input prices. 
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Comment  Lawrence Mishel 
I will limit my comments to the evaluation of  the U.S.  manufacturing output 
data, BEA’s Gross Product Originating (GPO) Series. Of  course, these data 
are essential to international competitiveness issues  since they are used  to 
measure: trends in U.S. manufacturing productivity and unit labor costs rela- 
tive to our competitors; recent trends in U.S. manufacturing productivity rel- 
ative to past performance; and the share of manufacturing in total U.S. output, 
an indicator of the shrinkage of our “industrial base.” 
My first comment is that Lawrence neglects to inform the reader that BEA 
has suspended publication of the GPO series pending a thorough revision. In 
July 1988 BEA responded to criticism of the GPO series, acknowledging that 
“the criticisms warrant careful attention,” and providing their own estimates 
of the magnitudes of various measurement errors in the GPO series.’ In June 
1989 BEA suspended the series until it could be thoroughly revised (eventu- 
ally back to 1972). As of  December 1990, no new  data have been released. 
Spokespersons for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which uses the GPO series 
in its productivity series, have also indicated agreement with the criticisms.* 
This history suggests two points. First, Lawrence may feel that GPO series 
reflects economic reality, but the two statistical agencies involved are quite 
skeptical of their own data. Second, given BEA’s acknowledgement of  mea- 
surement errors, the issue is not whether the GPO series is wrong; instead, the 
issues are the size of the measurement errors and whether a properly corrected 
GPO series will yield significantly different trends in manufacturing output 
and  productivity growth.  Lawrence,  in  a confusing logic,  examines some 
measurement errors to see whether they explain the “value-added intensity 
puzzle” in one subperiod (1982-85),  finds that they do not, and then con- 
cludes that the GPO series does not overstate the growth of  manufacturing 
output enough to suggest that sector has declined as a share of GNP.3 
Lawrence’s analysis does not provide an evaluation of the GPO series. It is 
only a partial analysis covering selected time periods and measurement errors. 
Because Lawrence does not assess the cumulative effect of  the measurement 
Lawrence Mishel is the research director of the Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. 
I. Bureau of  Economic Analysis, “Gross Product by Industry: Comments on Recent Criticism,” 
Survey of Current Business 68 (1988): 132-33.  Criticism came from: Lawrence Mishel, Manufac- 
turing Numbers: How Inaccurate Statistics Conceal US.  Industrial Decline (Washington, D.C. : 
Economic Policy Institute, 1988); Edward F. Denison, Estimares of  Productiviry Change by In- 
dustry: An Evaluation and an Alternarive (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,  1989); 
and U.S. Congress, Office of  Technology Assessment,  Technology and the American Economic 
Transition: Choicesfor the Future (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). 
2. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Council on Competitiveness, “Manufacturing ‘Comeback’ 
Disputed,” Challenges (March 1989). 
3. For lack of  space, I  do not deal with Lawrence’s doubts as to whether there is the “value- 
added intensity puzzle” I raised in Mishel (1988). It should be noted, however, that all measure- 
ment errors which lead to an overstatement of constant dollar value-added growth will contribute 
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errors his analysis is not disciplined so as to distinguish between “large” and 
“small” problems with the GPO series. My assessment of Lawrence’s analysis 
will show that the measurement errors in the GPO series are so large that a 
properly corrected series will yield significantly different trends. 
Table 1OC. 1 and the following analysis, drawn from my earlier assessment 
of the GPO series4  provide a useful reference point. 
How does Lawrence’s analysis compare to mine? Let’s start with the “im- 
port price bias,” the problem arising when domestic price trends are used to 
track imported input prices. (When import prices rise more slowly than do- 
mestic prices, then inputs are understated and value added overstated.) Law- 
rence says a 10 percent import price bias results in a 1.5  percent overstatement 
of  output and, consequently, that the  19 percent relative price increase be- 
tween 1982 and  1985 overstated 1985 output by  2.9 percent. Data in Law- 
rence’s table 10.2 allow us to extend this analysis to the 1980 to 1985 period, 
where a 32.6 percent import price bias implies a 4.9 percent output overstate- 
ment in  1985. My  analysis (based on the BEA analysis) points to an 0.5 per- 
cent annual error, or a roughly 3 percent output overstatement over the 1979 
and 1985 period. Lawrence’s estimate for the 1982-85  period is thus equal to 
my estimate for the entire 1979-85  period. Extending his analysis to 1980- 
85 shows an estimated measurement error-the  4.9 percent overstatement- 
which is larger than my estimate (assuming no bias in  1979-80 based on the 
similar value of the dollar) and which is equivalent to saying that 4.9 percent- 
age points, or more than a third, of  the  13.4 percent manufacturing output 
growth in the GPO series between 1979 and 1985 is ficti~nal.~ 
Now  turn to computers. Lawrence calculates that one needs to reduce man- 
ufacturing output growth by 0.26 percent annually to correct for the mislead- 
ing weighting scheme in the 1979-87  period. My correction was for an 0.3 
percent per year error; there is not much difference on this point. 
Lawrence in passing seems to accept the presence of a measurement error 
due to  the overstatement of  service input prices (see Denison 1989, BEA 
1988, and Mishel 1989), which BEA suggests overstates manufacturing out- 
put growth by 0.3 percent annually.6 
My  evaluation of Lawrence’s analysis is that he assesses the specific GPO 
measurement errors in the 1979-87  period to be as large or larger than I do. I 
4.  Lawrence  Mishel, “The Late Great  Debate on Deindustrialization,” Challenge (January- 
February 1989): 35-43. 
5. One reason it is larger may be that Lawrence, quite appropriately, accounts for both the rise 
in imports and the price bias, while BEA only examined the latter. Lawrence points out that BEA 
estimated the effect of the import bias over the 1972-85  period as inconsequential. Nevertheless, 
the measurement error clearly affects the timing of growth, improving trends in the 1970s relative 
to the 1980s. 
6. Lawrence properly notes my “arbitrary” assignment of  a one-percent overstatement of  ser- 
vice input prices. My analysis simply repeats that of BEA. It can easily be argued that productivity 
growth in financial services and in other sectors selling to manufacturing has been understated by 
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Table lOC.1  Revisions to Output and Productivity Growth Rates (annual growth 
rates, %) 
~~  ~ 
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Corrected estimates are not simply the difference between the published estimates and the indi- 
vidual corrections, because of  the cumulative effect of  corrections. 
would therefore disagree with Lawrence’s conclusion that his analysis “pro- 
vides some comfort to those who use aggregate data on manufacturing out- 
put,” especially for the years since 1979. 
Any appraisal of the GPO data for the 1970s must center on the propriety 
of  the fudge-factor adjustments made to the 1972 and 1973 data. These ad- 
justments shifted output equal to 2 percent of GDP out of manufacturing and 
into other sectors, thereby raising output growth rates from that base period. 
The size of  these adjustments is surprising, given that they were made for a 
benchmark year (1 972) in the best-measured sector. I would only point out 
that BEA is reexamining the appropriateness of these adjustments. 
Both of  our analyses may overstate manufacturing output growth by  not 
considering the possible upward bias in  the measurement of nominal value- 
added growth (which leads to an understatement of nominal input growth and 
an overstatement of constant-dollar value-added growth). Lawrence dismisses 
this problem, saying Census and BEA  nominal value added have had “simi- 
lar” growth rates over the long period  (1977-86).  However, since Census 
value added includes purchased services, one would expect the Census mea- 
sure to grow more rapidly, as it did in the 1972-79  period (according to table 
10.1, 1  1.3  percent versus 91.8 percent). It is curious that when the GPO series 
increases at the same rate as the Census measure, as from 1977 to 1986, or 
much faster, as from 1979 to 1986 (45.9 percent versus 38.4 percent). Law- 
rence finds a “similar” growth rate by  combining a period when the Census 
measure appropriately rises faster than the BEA  measure and a period when 
the BEA  measure inexplicably grows faster than the Census measure. It must 
be noted that a seemingly small difference in growth rates of  nominal value 
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The deviation between the Census and GPO nominal trends from  1979 to 
1986 implies an annual difference of 0.45  percent in constant-dollar growth, 
an amount equal to one-fourth the reported growth. 
Table  10.6 provides little comfort that  the GPO series is correct.  Law- 
rence’s own analysis shows the vast disparity between the FRB industrial pro- 
duction (IP) indexes and BEA measures at a 2-digit level, so the fact that the 
aggregates move together is only serendipitous.’ The FRB industrial capacity 
index adds no further independent information, since it is derived from the IP 
index  and capacity utilization data.  This leaves us  with  the gross and  net 
growth of  capital stock. I would argue that the net measure of capital is the 
better measure of the growth of our industrial base, and it grew only 60  per- 
cent as quickly as the GPO series. Lawrence should also consider the growth 
of  gross output in this table; it is a measure of output that grew far less than 
the GPO measure. 
What does all of this tell us about the critical international competitiveness 
indicators based on the GPO series? My  “corrected” estimates of  the GPO 
series and, I submit, Robert Lawrence’s own analysis, suggest several conclu- 
sions.  (1) Manufacturing productivity was  better  in  the  1980s than  in  the 
1970s, but significantly less so than previously believed. (2) U.S. manufactur- 
ing productivity growth was below average relative to other advanced coun- 
tries during the 1980s. (3) Manufacturing’s share of  output declined by  from 
3 to 4  percentage points since  1973 (but mostly since  1979), indicating a 
shrinkage of our industrial base (called deindustrialization); more than half of 
the shrinkage of manufacturing employment is due to this deindustrialization 
(which has cost 3 to 4  million jobs), and not to relatively faster productivity 
growth. 
Comment  Barry Eichengreen 
The reader of  Robert Lawrence’s interesting paper and Lawrence Mishel’s 
equally interesting response has the sense of  observing a curiously choreo- 
graphed boxing match. The two pugilists know one another well from prior 
encounters,  it would  appear. They circle one another warily. Many  of  the 
punches they throw fail to connect. To  the crowd it is unclear whether their 
aim is off or whether they are really trying to set one another up for the ulti- 
mate sucker punch. 
In this comment I put on my  referee’s striped shirt and step into the ring. I 
7. It is worth noting that the annual growth rate of the IP series exceeded that of the GPO series 
by  about 0.7 percent throughout the postwar period to 1973, and by  1 percent in the  1973-79 
period. 
Barry Eichengreen is professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley and a 
research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 385  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
hope that proximity will enable me to ferret out the protagonists’  true inten- 
tions. Hopefully there will be no stray punches to KO the referee. 
Robert Lawrence has argued in a series of influential publications  that the 
manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy is holding up relatively well. The 
share of manufacturing output in U.S. GDP has remained virtually unchanged 
over the past fifteen years. In contrast, Lawrence Mishel has argued in various 
publications on the subject that American manufacturing is in deep water. The 
standard statistics used to assess its competitive position, Mishel asserts, are 
seriously flawed. Appropriately corrected, they reveal an alarming downward 
trend in the share of manufacturing in national output. 
According  to  the  Commerce Department  measure  of  value  added  upon 
which Lawrence relies, the manufacturing share of GDP has declined at most 
from 23 percent in  1973 to 22 percent in  1987. According to Mishel, these 
aggregates disguise the alarming fact that the share of noncomputer manufac- 
turing in GDP has fallen from 20.4 percent to 18.0 percent over the period. 
Leaving aside computer production,  Mishel warns, American manufacturing 
is shrinking before our eyes. 
Should we be disturbed by this decline in the noncomputer manufacturing 
share of  GDP? If we are shareholders or employees of other manufacturing 
industries, the answer is probably yes. If we are concerned, however, with the 
international competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing as a whole, the answer 
is probably  no.  Manufacturing  competitiveness  is renewed  and maintained 
through  structural  shifts from sunset to sunrise industries. One can imagine 
similar calculations for the early twentieth century showing that the buoyancy 
of the manufacturing share of GDP was due largely to automobiles; we might 
have worried then about the competitiveness of other manufacturing, perhaps 
citing the declining wagon and buggy-whip trades as illustrations  of the fate 
of American industry. 
It is reassuring to learn from the paper that similar trends are evident also in 
some other countries whose manufacturing industries are rarely criticized for 
inadequate competitiveness. Lawrence shows that in Japan the contribution of 
electronics has been even more important than in the United States. Japanese 
textiles, primary metals, and food production are in decline. The broad simi- 
larities across countries in these patterns suggest that what we are observing 
is mainly the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. 
The more fundamental challenge to Lawrence’s optimism is Mishel’s next 
argument: that even including computer production, the share of manufactur- 
ing in U.S. GDP is in rapid decline, and that the phenomenon is disguised 
from the naive observer by flaws in the statistics. Value-added measures sug- 
gest more rapid growth of  U.S.  manufacturing output than  do gross output 
measures.  Such rapid growth of  manufacturing  is implausible,  Mishel sug- 
gests, since there has been rapid growth of outsourcing in the 1980s. If all that 
Honda plants in the U.S.  have been doing is assembling imported kits, then 
value added should be growing more slowly than gross output, not faster, as 386  Robert Z. Lawrence 
the official statistics show.  Lawrence points out that gross output figures not 
only count foreign-sourced inputs but also double count shipments between 
U.S.  plants.  Outsourcing,  while  it  creates  one  bias,  eliminates  another. 
Though this is a valid point in theory, we need more information about how 
much difference it makes in practice. 
Another statistical problem concerns import prices. Since value added is 
constructed by subtracting inputs from gross output, accurate input price de- 
flators are critical. The BEA input price series is derived from shipments by 
domestic facilities. When import prices are falling relative to domestic prices, 
as in the first half of the 1980s, the price of inputs will be overstated and their 
quantity understated. Estimates of output and productivity growth will over- 
state actual performance. The implication is that output and productivity grew 
more slowly than suggested by the official statistics before 1985, faster there- 
after. Mishel eliminates a quarter of the growth of value added between 1979 
and 1989 on these grounds and increases the growth rate by about 10 percent 
between 1985 and 1987. 
Lawrence suggests that Mishel’s adjustments are arbitrary. He shows that 
between 1982 and 1985 (the period during which value added grew more rap- 
idly than gross output) the prices of  imported industrial supplies fell by  18 
percent when compared to the prices of manufacturing materials and compo- 
nents, but by only 8 percent when compared to the prices of domestic crude 
materials. The question is which comparison is appropriate. Compromising 
and assuming that domestic prices understate the fall in import prices by  10 
percent and recognizing that imported inputs account for less than 10 percent 
of total inputs suggests that this bias can account for only a small share of the 
divergence between the value-added and gross-output measures of  growth. 
Lawrence’s own guess is that this bias accounts for 30 percent of  the total 
divergence during the period. 
Lawrence’s data (table 10.3) suggest that the decline in the relative prices 
of  industrial supplies was more than reversed after 1985. Mishel’s data sug- 
gest that it was not. The dispute remains unresolved. 
The Commerce Department itself adjusts its value-added data to make the 
components for manufacturing, services, and other sectors sum to aggregate 
output, which is derived separately and more reliably from expenditure data. 
These adjustments revise downward 1972-73  manufacturing output very dra- 
matically, producing a  much  more  rapid  growth rate  of  output thereafter. 
Mishel argues that  it is not  valid to apportion any significant share of  the 
discrepancy to manufacturing, since estimates for that sector are much more 
reliable than those for the rest of the economy. Input-output data, as he ana- 
lyzes them, are more consistent with the preadjustment data. Mishel reverses 
half of the Commerce Department’s adjustment and shows that this eliminates 
more than a third of the growth of U.S. manufacturing in the 1970s. For the 
1980s, in contrast, the effect is minimal. 
Lawrence also analyzes input-output data, demonstrating that it converges 387  Output Growth in Manufacturing 
with other sources by  the  1980s. He thus supports Mishel’s conclusion that 
the  Commerce  Department  adjustment  has  little  impact  on  the  estimated 
growth of U.S.  manufacturing  in the 1980s. This debate matters for how we 
view U.S. manufacturing’s competitive performance in the 1970s, but not in 
the 1980s. 
In the end, one comes away from this debate with the image of  the protag- 
onists  as blowing  soap bubbles  at one another. The available  statistics are 
simply too fragile to firmly support either view, or to do irreparable damage 
to either. If ever there was a debate that supported the case for further invest- 
ment in statistical refinement, this is it. 